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ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, we discuss and analyse the use of scenario interventions in organisations to overcome 
business-as-usual thinking - by promoting divergence of opinion and subsequent debate about the 
nature of the future. We shown that cognitive biases at the level of individual participants in a 
scenario workshop can both help and hinder the progression of scenario thinking and we go on to 
demonstrate how expert facilitation of the group process can help generate process-gain with the 
result that  individually-held overconfidence is challenged and attenuated. 
Key-words: business-as-usual thinking, organisational inertia, cognitive biases, overconfidence, 
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Many companies typically tend to focus on their immediate business environment. They spend most 
of their energy and resources on their familiar set of products, customers, competitors, technologies, 
and stakeholders. Psychological research has shown that such a focus risks missing key signals from 
the peripheral environment. A false sense of business-as-usual mind-set can creep into organisations 
that are riding on the wave of a successful past. What is needed is not only to sense incipient change, 
but also to anticipate change, and know where to look more carefully for clues. Seemingly random or 
disparate pieces of information - that at first appear to be background noise – need to be recognized as 
part of a larger pattern. The scenario thinking method focuses on enhancing a process of discussion 
and debate within a top management team, in contrast to the traditional, more rationalistic approach 
involving the search for a single optimal strategy. As we shall show, scenario thinking allows 
managers to better recognise and interpret weak signals of change that are already emerging in the 
present. It facilitates a shift in managers’ mental models and provides a challenge to counter business-
as-usual thinking. 
In the process of a scenario thinking intervention within an organization, team members must use 
their knowledge of past and current events within the market, firm, and customer-base to help 
anticipate the future. However, cognitive biases are thought to hinder the effectiveness and 
progression of scenario thinking. To date, a small number of researchers have published work 
analysing the use of certain biases and heuristics within scenario thinking, which we further discuss in 
this chapter.  
Within the group-based setting of a typical scenario workshop, a deliberate and high degree of 
“turbulence” is promoted in order to influence the process of surfacing codified and tacit knowledge 
with the subsequent aim of using this knowledge to enrich the group’s framing of plausible futures. 
Given the complexity of scenario workshops, the many process steps involved and the 
aforementioned turbulence, an experienced facilitator is typically used to support and guide 
participants through the process. However, facilitation of scenario interventions is not without 
problems and issues. Indeed, (Eden, 1992) contended that learning within strategy development is a 
social process with power and politics inherent in this process.  The role of facilitation in this social 
process acts to achieve negotiated conclusion to a scenario development process (Ackerman & Eden 
2012). 
 
1.0 The prevalence of business-as-usual thinking in organizations 
Companies typically tend to focus on their immediate environment. They spend most of their energy 
and resources on their familiar set of products, customers, competitors, technologies and stakeholders. 
Especially in wake of limited resources, they generally tend to solve short-term problems in order to 
keep the business running. Psychological research has shown that a such a focus risks missing key 
signals from the periphery (Schoemaker et al, 2013)). Also, organisations that have been successful in 
the past can fail to adapt and change as the external environment changes. In fact, when business 
conditions change, the most successful companies can be the slowest to adapt. It is ironic that many 
factors that led to a company’s success in the first place – focus, confident leadership, corporate 
culture etc. – also are instrumental in company’s decline. The strategic frames, the processes, the 
relationships, and values with which the managers operate lead to an organisational inertia that 
hinders sensing, digesting, and acting in a dynamic environment that demands agile and decisive 
actions. A false sense of business-as-usual mind-set creeps into organisations that are riding on waves 
of successful past. As Miller (1992) points out in his book on the Icarus Paradox, “Failure teaches 
leaders valuable lessons, but good results only re-inforce their preconceptions and tether them more 
firmly to their tried-and-true recipes”. He continues, “stellar performers view the world through a 
narrowing telescope. One point of view takes over; one set of assumptions comes to dominate. The 
result is complacency and overconfidence”. Moreover, one source of momentum is structural 
memory, which in essence relates to memory the organisation builds up as a result of a perceived 
successful strategy; the more successful it is, the more it will be implemented routinely, automatically, 
and unquestioningly. One underlying assumption inherent in such situations is that all other variables, 
most importantly those related to external environment, have not changed.  
A classic case-in-point is that of the company Kodak. Kodak was a market leader with tremendous 
market share and technology leadership in photography based on films. The camera/film industry was 
hit by a disruptive innovation (digital imaging) that destroyed the traditional business model based on 
films. Kodak was fully aware of the emergence of digital imaging, but it still struggled to respond 
effectively. From 2003 till 2012, Kodak went through multiple restructuring and business model re-
innovation efforts. Kodak finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2012, with enormous challenges 
and a bleak future ahead (Gaveti et al, 2005).  
Another phenomenon, called hubris, is worth mentioning in this context. There is some evidence that 
hubris, defined as extreme pride or self-confidence, is salient with people in power, such as CEOs of 
companies. Petit and Bollaert (2012) have looked into the negative effects of CEO hubris on firm 
performance. Many top managers climb the ranks based on their past performance. Previous success 
leads them to strongly believe in their strategic intent thus far. Their confidence level increases with 
each step up the ladder. Over-confident people with power can be an extreme liability for a company. 
They tend to become overbearing (“I know better because I have succeeded in the past”), complacent 
(especially if they see no urgency to change, their experience and deep pockets will see them through) 
and blinkered (they seek information that supports their existing beliefs and ignore information that 
doesn’t fit). Of course, not every successful manager is overbearing, complacent and blinkered. 
Rather, these are tendencies every manager should be aware of and guard against. 
Regardless of past success, most companies limit their vision within the operating boundaries of their 
daily business. Few extend it to a peripheral vision involving remote markets, new competitors, 
emerging technologies and seemingly tangential information. What is needed is not only to sense 
incipient change, but also to anticipate change and know where to look more carefully for clues. 
Seemingly random or disparate pieces of information first appear to be background noise, but which 
can, potentially, be recognized as part of a larger pattern. Companies that are able to anticipate the 
market changes and quickly adapt their strategies are the ones with sustained success. These are 
companies that constantly try to integrate a wide range of market signals in their strategy making 
process and encourage a strategic conversation within the company. In his classic HBR paper, De 
Geus (1997) analyzed organizations that successfully thrived over many years. He found high 
corporate “mortality rates” - for example, by 1983, one-third of the 1970 fortune 500 companies had 
been acquired, broken into pieces or merged with other companies. One of the features common to 
some of the most resilient organizations is their sensitivity to the world around them. Given the 
extremely dynamic and complex environments that companies face, it is absolutely crucial that 
companies install structures and processes that allow them to sense, recognize, react, and adapt to 
their external context. 
Scenario thinking, when practiced in a comprehensive and holistic manner, is a powerful method that 
can allow organisations to not only counter many of the perils described above, but also to build 
sustained competitive advantage. Sull (2005) uses the term “fog of the future” to describe 
unpredictability. In an environment with deep uncertainties, the quest for the one perfect strategy can 
be a futile exercise. Instead, companies require structures and processes that allow them to be vigilant, 
open-minded, and flexible enough to react fast. Ideally, mechanisms should be in place to counter 
biases in day-to-day decision making and facilitate effective use of available information. The 
scenario thinking method provides such a process, in contrast to the traditional, more rationalistic 
approach involving the search for one optimal strategy.  
 
1.1 Scenarios as an antidote 
Scenario thinking method can be used for various purposes. Van der Heijden et al (2002) argued that 
it is very important to have clarity on the purpose for using this method. It can be permanently 
anchored in the regular strategic planning process or can be used to raise and/or answer specific 
strategy questions. The process involves generation of plausible scenarios that adequately capture all 
the perceived trends and uncertainties. The scenario method provides a structure to understand the 
business environment and provides challenge to business-as-usual thinking. During a scenario 
workshop, managers are forced to think through their assumptions and thus can identify 
inconsistencies in their own thinking and in that of other participants. At the same time, scenario work 
necessitates undertaking a detailed analysis of the external world, challenges team-members’   
perceptions, stretches their mental models, and helps develop a shared view of how the uncertainties 
and trends will develop and interact in the focal business context. The process thus has an overall 
effect of providing enhanced understanding and challenge to conventional thinking. Most managers 
use mental anchors from the recent past to encode future change. However, using past events can be 
highly misleading. Scenario thinking allows managers to better recognise and interpret weak signals. 
It facilitates a shift in mental models and systematically counters business-as-usual thinking. The 
process enables the organisation to become what is known as a “learning organisation” -  developing 
mechanisms to challenge its day-to-day decisions, and developing structures to sense and anticipate 
external changes.  
However, since scenario thinking is based on the judgments of participants in the process, what if 
those judgments are, in themselves, of poor quality? Perhaps judgmental flaws and biases at the level 
of the individual manager will be magnified rather than reduced with the group-based scenario 
workshop? It is to these issues that we turn next. 
 
2.0 The prevalence of heuristics and potential biases within scenario thinking 
In any scenario development process, team members must use their knowledge of past and current 
events to help anticipate the future (van der Heijden et al, 2002). The scenario method  constructs a 
range of plausible futures to provide alternative frameworks by which an organisation can gain early 
recognition and facilitate strong organisational responses. In other words, the aim is to help 
management teams think more broadly, rather than determine what they should think. The wider the 
range of plausible futures an organisation can envision, the better position they will be in to anticipate 
the opportunities and threats that may emerge. With this focus in mind, biased thinking and 
misapplied heuristics can diminish the effectiveness and progression of scenario planning. As 
illustrated in the Icarus Paradox – and discussed in section 1.0 - a business-as-usual perspective can 
steer a firm into a narrow view of the future, resulting in a lack of ability to adjust to market and 
environmental changes. 
In the 1970’s, Kahneman and Tversky’s work on cognitive biases and heuristics brought a new wave 
of insight into the field of judgment and decision making. They expanded on the perspective that 
cognitive experience is a dual system. System 1 constantly monitors the environment and makes basic 
assessments with little cognitive effort. System 2 directs attention and searches memory for answers. 
Thus, system 1 thinking is heuristic and can be biased whereas system 2 thinking is engaged when 
complexity is consciously analysed – as in a scenario thinking intervention within an organization 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
To date, a small number of studies have empirically investigated the effects of cognitive heuristics – 
and potential resultant biases - in scenario thinking. The studies take one of two perspectives, either 
how biases affect the scenario process, or how the scenario process eliminates certain biases. 
The most widely investigated bias in the literature is confidence. As Kahneman (2011, p 17) stated, 
“We are prone to overestimate how much we understand about the world and to underestimate the 
role of chance in events.” A variety of experimental methods have been employed to measure levels 
of confidence in forecasting efforts after participating in scenario thinking exercises. Confidence – or 
overconfidence as with Schoemaker (1993) and Bradfield (2008) – leads a group (or individual) to 
over-value one’s own opinion on a subject, independent of the truth. This has the consequence of 
narrowing, rather than broadening perspectives during the scenario process. Schnaars and Topol 
(1987) found that reviewing scenarios increased individuals’ confidence in their own generated 
forecasts, compared to just reviewing graphical representations of past sales. Kuhn and Sniezek 
(1996) found similar results with their participants. Reviewing either single or multiple scenarios, 
regardless of message, increased confidence in participants’ generated forecasts compared to those 
who reviewed no scenario. However, confidence in their forecasts decreased as the projected date 
moved farther into the future. That is, forecasting for 10 years in the future was given greater 
confidence ratings than for 20 years. Bradfield (2008) used observational measures to assess 
overconfidence in group work. Each group reflected what was termed an “embedded cognitive script” 
(p 209), in which scenarios appeared to come from a pre-determined script of factors with causal links 
that largely went unchanged even after suggestions of more extreme developments, more pressing 
factors, and interventions by an expert facilitator, thus reflecting overconfidence and belief 
perseverance in their generated scenarios.  
Schoemaker (1993), on the other hand, compared confidence ranges before and after participants 
generated their own scenarios, as opposed to reviewing. Unlike the previous studies, Shoemaker’s 
experiment showed that overconfidence decreased (i.e. increased confidence ranges) as an effect of 
scenario generation. The conscious exercise of thinking broadly about future possibilities helped 
counter the natural tendency to form a myopic view of the future (system 1 thinking). Sampling from 
experts in the field of U.S. freight transportation, Phandis, et al (2014) found somewhat similar results 
to Schoemaker. Experts worked with a long-range planning horizon, generated a single scenario as a 
group, then evaluated all scenarios from each group. Confidence levels in group forecasting did not 
increase  after reviewing multiple scenarios. However, they did not decrease either. Furthermore, 
confidence levels were less likely to change after reviewing only a single scenario if prior assessments 
of the scenario already had the highest level of confidence.  
It is clear that investigations into confidence and scenario planning yield varying, even opposing, 
results. This could be due to the different measurement tools, different participant samplings 
(undergraduate and MBA students, CEOs, experts, and colleagues), the difference between reviewing 
verses generating scenarios, as well as the specifics of the scenario topics. What is important to note, 
is that confidence is an important element in the decision making process, and as such, requires our 
awareness to its effects and use. The more confident that an individual  is in his/her own judgment, 
the less likely he/she will be to willingly change his judgment. For scenario planning to be effective, 
both participants and practitioners must be open to differing views and opinions, and allow for 
malleability and novelty throughout the process.  
A variety of other cognitive biases have also been explored in relation to scenario planning. Meissner 
and Wulf (2013) compared the effects of the full scenario process against a partial scenario process as 
well as a different traditional strategic planning exercise and their effects on the framing bias and 
decision quality. When people’s judgments are influenced by how information is presented they are 
said to be working with a framing bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). An example of the framing 
bias can be seen when a firm is willing to adopt a business strategy that shows a 60% success rate, but 
is unwilling to adopt the exact same business strategy when it shows a 40% failure rate. Results of the 
study revealed that a framing bias influenced the decision process in all groups except those that 
engaged in a full scenario or  strategic planning process. However, participating in the full scenario 
process reduced the framing bias more than the comparable strategic planning tools. Furthermore, 
decision quality was evaluated between the full scenario analysis group and the traditional strategic 
planning group. Meissner and Wulf’s results demonstrated that participating in the full scenario 
process enhanced individual decision quality more than traditional strategic planning tools.  
Bradfield’s (2008) experimental groups showed use of the availability heuristic by focusing their 
initial exploratory discussions toward more highly publicised and recent events, even when shown 
that some events were more rare and less threatening than other unconsidered events. The availability 
heuristic describes the tendency to overestimate the probability of events that are more easily 
remembered, that is, more available to recall from memory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). As a 
consequence, people tend to underestimate the probability of less easily remembered events. 
Schoemaker (1993), on the other hand, revealed that the scenario process could use one cognitive bias 
to counter a possibly more damaging bias. By requiring participants to reflect on extreme scenarios – 
rare, yet plausible events – the belief bias appeared to counter the more commonly employed 
availability heuristic. Engagement in the scenario process prompts team members to devote attention 
to events that are less thought-about and lie beyond the immediately recalled. By doing this, 
Schoemaker found that broadening one’s focus to consider rare, yet plausible events allowed such 
events to be perceived as more believable than when normally evaluated. By increasing the 
believability of possible future events, the scenario thinking process guides team- and individual-
problem solving toward a deeper understanding of the world in which the organisation operates – 
beyond the readily available business-as-usual. 
Tetlock (2006) found similar results with his study, but expanded a bit more on the reasoning. Not 
only did engaging in a scenario process increase the imaginability of a variety of plausible outcomes, 
and thus the believability of those outcomes, he found the exercise has a countering effect on the 
hindsight bias as well. Also known as the I-knew-it-all-along effect, this is a failure of our 
autobiographical memory. In the face of new evidence, people have a tendency to misrepresent their 
original opinions when asked to reconstruct them, by showing a favouratism for the new evidence. 
However, through unpacking, reconstructing, and focusing on alternatives throughout the scenario 
process, imaginability is extensively engaged. This leads to more accurate recall of previously offered 
factors. Tetlock holds that the hindsight bias limits our appreciation of our previously imagined 
possibilities. An important element to scenario planning is not to discredit too quickly previously 
offered forecasts and driving forces, because beliefs that were reasonable prior to new information can 
still offer beneficial support in other stages of the process.  
We conclude that the analysis of complexity inherent in scenario thinking – i.e., System 2 thinking - 
can be helpful in overcoming bias in judgments/assessments derived by the unconscious use of 
System 1 mechanisms, but can also be informed by the same mechanisms. At the same time, bias may 
be a by-product that is magnified by use of the scenario development process. As such, the facilitator 
of any scenario exercise must be alert to the potential issues that may arise, and that we have 
documented and discussed. Success is found in the right balance of theory and imagination driven 
thinking. Developing this theme of bias and remedies, we next turn to the scenario intervention 
process itself. How can a management team be best facilitated to think deeply about the future? 
 
3.0 Facilitating scenario interventions within organizations 
Within the group-based setting of a typical scenario workshop, a deliberate and high degree of 
“turbulence” is promoted  in order to influence the process of surfacing codified and tacit knowledge 
(van der Heijden et al, 2002), with the subsequent aim of using this knowledge to enrich the group’s 
framing of plausible futures. Turbulence can perhaps be equated to “equivocality” - described by 
Ackerman and Eden (2012:24) as a fuzziness, within which negotiations can be more effective as this 
fuzziness provides participants with the opportunity to change their mind, essentially saving face. 
Given the complexity of scenario workshops, the many process steps involved and the 
aforementioned turbulence, an experienced facilitator is typically used to support and guide 
participants through the process. However, facilitation of scenario interventions is not without 
problems and issues. Van der Heijden et al, (2002) argued that use of a facilitator from within a host 
organization - but who has no direct expertise in the substantive scenario issue - may not command 
the participants’ authority to play the facilitator role effectively. This can be detrimental to perceived 
success of the intervention. In a study of MBA students within a teaching-based scenario intervention, 
Bradfield (2008) found that although the student facilitator highlighted problematic issues in surfacing 
driving forces and causality, the group did not act on these alerts and continued, to develop their own 
initial ideas. Members of this facilitated group concluded that the facilitator’s interventions were 
passive and ineffective. 
Indeed, Grinyer (2000) asserts that an external facilitator is more likely to be accepted as an objective 
party, can remain impartial throughout the proceedings, and is therefore suitably positioned to 
challenge established views held by senior management, without fear of reprisal. To achieve the role 
effectively, the facilitator requires skill in promotion of the sharing of divergent views within a 
scenario workshop - encouraging debate and open conversation. Ackerman & Eden (2012: 25) 
suggest that if a facilitator is liberal in the praising group members for contributions, (especially in the 
early stages of the workshop), this will provide members with the incentive to defend their 
contributions, thus the possibility of changing opinion may be inhibited. Allocating praise and  credit 
is perhaps more beneficial in the later stages of the workshop, when the group members are in the 
process of reaching agreement.  Within the scenario workshop setting, the facilitator should not 
contribute to the content of the group’s discussion, rather the facilitator attends to member-provided 
content - given the interaction of content and process (Eden and Radford, 1990).  If the group 
members were to view the facilitator as an expert in content then this, coupled with his/her facilitator 
status, may adversely impact group members’ ability to call upon their own expertise. Furthermore, 
Phillips & Phillips (1993) contend that explicit contributions by the facilitator will reduce his/her 
ability to observe and intervene in the on-going group process.   
 
In a parallel literature, Schweiger  and Sandberg (1986) found  that where devils advocacy is adopted 
in a strategic decision making contex - to stimulate challenge and disagreement - the decisions taken 
are of higher quality in comparison to those taken by teams who did not adopt the approach. Fostering 
an environment where diverse views can be openly shared and contested thus creates the conditions 
whereby business-a-usual thinking can be challenged. Similarly, Amason & Schweiger (1994) 
contend that cognitive conflict - termed by De Dru (2006) as task conflict, where there exist 
differences in judgements regarding a decision or choices of alternatives -  is valuable. However, a 
scenario workshop facilitator needs to be sensitive to the fact that cognitive conflict may lead to 
relationship conflict which can adversely impact group work - since any criticism received may be 
viewed as  personal criticism. 
To ensure the engagement of all participants in any group-based activity, Korsgaard et al, (1995) 
emphasised the importance of using processes designed to create perceived procedural justice – where 
everyone’s input is considered and valued. The facilitator, aware of the importance of eliciting views 
from all group members and in attempts to minimise participants periodically disengaging from the 
process, should stimulate the expression of varied interpretations and reduce the dominance of 
powerful stakeholders in any conversation – for example, those who may consistently and excessively 
consume air-time when asserting an opinion, at the expense of others. Indeed in the context of 
scenario planning, Hodgkinson & Wright (2002) highlighted how the dominating personality of a 
CEO adversely impacted a scenario intervention – even though the rules of procedural justice had 
been agreed with the CEO before the scenario intervention was initiated. Indeed, Ackerman & Eden, 
(2012) contend that the strategy making process should encourage diversity of views in order to open 
up the strategic conversation, prior to seeking a convergence of views.  The use of “transitional 
objects” De Geus, (1988) such as causality maps, which are continuously updated to capture the views 
of all participants can influence shifts in thinking since these tools encourage participants to consider 
alternative perspectives (Ackerman & Eden, 2012).    Furthermore, Ackerman & Eden, (2012:25) 
contend that their “approach to the design of the facilitated support must recognise the role of some 
degree of anonymity in the causal maps used to record and encourage effective conversation”. 
Within the scenario planning workshop, the facilitator must also be acutely aware of the importance 
of group composition and its effect, given focus on the generation of uncertainties, assessment and 
consideration of causality, impacts, and the development of scenario stories. Schwartz (2011) argued 
that within a scenario workshop, views that are not sufficiently diverse can influence the development 
of a rather restricted range of scenarios. Hodgkinson & Healey (2008) asserted that to augment group 
information processing capability, the composition of the scenario team should be heterogeneous in 
terms of background, roles, experiences, etc. Van der Heijden et al (2002:167) also recommend that  
the composition of the scenario team should be somewhat heterogeneous - since this will enhance the 
expression and generation of new information and perhaps trigger new thoughts on the inter-
relationships between components of the scenarios that are in development. Moyer (1996), in a 
scenario planning intervention at British Airways, observed that group cohesion prevented the 
verbalisation of challenge within the groups of members’ implicit assumptions. The balance between 
the expression of divergent views and group cohesion is, in our view, a crucial one - since artificial 
consensus will lead to the development of simplistic scenarios. Additionally, early convergence of 
views will not provide sufficient opportunities for group members to alter their thinking. 
Hodgkinson & Healey (2008) and Franco, et al, (2013) contend that membership composition of a 
scenario team will influence the effectiveness of the scenario planning intervention. Furthermore, 
powerful stakeholders who are scenario team members can also adversely impact the scenario 
intervention (Cairns et al, 2006). Also, the cognitive styles of the participants engaged in the 
workshop activities should be considered by the facilitator in terms of their impacts on the scenario 
development activity. For example, based on the Jungian model Jung (1923), Franco et al, (2013) 
proposed that the presence of combinations of the four styles of information gathering and evaluation 
should be evaluated within the group-based membership. For example, any scenario group 
membership characterised solely by intuition thinking (NT) and intuition feeling (NF) members, 
namely a homogenous intuitive group, will be more effective - by optimistically engaging in social-
emotional and task processes  -  thus experiencing high levels of commitment and satisfaction.. In 
such predictions of the success of group-based activity, it must be noted that the homogeneity of the 
group members relates to the cognitive styles of group members, rather than in similarities/difference 
in social background, age, role, education etc.  
Hodgkinson & Clarke, (2007) argued that individuals who are analytically inclined may, in a scenario 
planning exercise, slow the proceedings given their inclination to approach the scenario development 
process in a rational argument-based, step by step manner. Whereas individuals who are intuitively 
orientated, in the sense that they prefer to gain an overview of issues rather than analyse details, will 
proceed more speedily through the scenario development process.. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of scenario interventions can also be impacted by an assertive facilitator 
bias, namely the “facilitator effect”, where, as asserted by Franco & Meadows, (2007), a facilitator 
identifies with participants of a similar cognitive type and consequently ends to disregard the 
views/inputs from participants of different cognitive styles. Given the facilitator is actively engaged in 
the scenario process, it can be difficult to disassociate oneself from the group and consequently the 
facilitator may then unintentionally associate with the individuals who display similar cognitive 
characteristics,  discounting views that are perhaps different. Franco & Meadows (2007) suggested 
that in order to eradicate such potential bias, the facilitator should, a-priori, be aware of the 
participants’ cognitive styles as well as their own. Furthermore, the facilitator should be capable, 
through experience, of identifying when such a biasing situation is unfolding and  take the necessary 
action to address the situation, perhaps by even-handedly restating alternative views and by 
summarising different positions neither positively or negatively, Grinyer (2000).  
 
4.0 Conclusions 
In summary, we have documented that scenario thinking interventions within organisations can 
provide a challenge to business-as-usual thinking. Such a challenge is non-adversarial and can be 
introduced as standard way that organisations are facilitated to think more broadly and deeply about 
their business environment. However, the scenario development process can have pitfalls and 
problems. Scenario thinking is based on judgments - and judgments are often produced by heuristic 
processes that may result in bias. These biases may be magnified rather than attenuated within the 
scenario development process. Additionally, the act of facilitating a group of individual managers to 
think about the future is problematic. The views of some group members may achieve, or be given, 
more influence on the in-development scenarios than the views of other participants. Clearly, the 
scenario workshop facilitator must be sensitive to both the individual cognitions and styles of each 
group member and to the on-going group-based processes and interactions.  
In our analysis, the content of in-development scenarios can be improved, although indirectly, by the 
quality of the facilitation.  The facilitator must be skilled in his/her ability to identify the on-going 
group dynamics and also possess the skills to successfully intervene when behaviours such as group-
think are adversely impacting the search for information, the expression of divergent views or the 
consideration of alternatives - all of which contribute to subsequent shifts in group-based thinking and 
can overcome initial inherent bias.  Effective intervention techniques such as “handing back in 
changed form” (Phillips & Phillips, 1993) can provide the participants with a different meaning 
regarding the focal situation - here the facilitator presents an analysis of a situation from a different 
perspective or frame, which assists the group in assigning new significance to the situation, 
overcoming initial overconfidence inherent in a singular framing.  The facilitator must also be mindful 
of non-verbal cues and thus be able to quickly deduce their impacts to then effectively address the 
situation to ensure all participants are  allowed equal air-time and that their contributions are 
accurately reflected in subsequent documentation. As Ackerman & Eden (2012, p282) noted, “good 
facilitators will seek to record what was meant rather than precisely what was said.”. 
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